io.github.Kzino/vorim-mcp-server

"AI agent identity, permissions, trust scores, and tamper-evident audit trails via Vorim AI"

This server’s public MCP-registry listing advertises a permission_change capability. If it performs that action on behalf of an AI agent, it should require an accountable human authorization receipt before executing — The listing alone does not reveal whether that action is exposed, gated, or executed in a deployment.

Is this your project? Publish the tool schema and test the runtime.

Wrap the high-risk tools with @emilia-protocol/gate so they require a receipt evidence, then run npx @emilia-protocol/fire-drill against your manifest for static declaration coverage and the separate EG-1 suite against the deployed handler.

Registry-level signal only: derived from this server’s publicly-advertised name and description in registry.modelcontextprotocol.io. It is not a scan of any deployment, not a tool-level manifest scan, and not a vulnerability report. It indicates the server advertises a capability that, for agent use, warrants a receipt requirement.